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Case Note
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—More Protection for Digital
Information? The Supreme Court Holds Warrantless Cell Phone
Searches do not Fall Under the Search Incident to Arrest Exception;
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)
James B. Peters*
Introduction
As technology advances, the balance between the governmental and individual
privacy interests fluctuates.1 For example, advances in cell phone technology have
changed the way people communicate and store private information.2 Originally,
cell phones were primarily used for verbal communication. The “smart phone,”
however, has vastly expanded cell phone capabilities.3 Smart phones are used for
a wide array of functions including storing financial data, photographs, e-mails,
and personal calendars.4 Because cell phones have the capability to store large
quantities of data, courts face the issue of whether information stored on a cell
phone is protected from warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment.5 In
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thank the 2014–2015 Wyoming Law Review Editorial Board for their insightful comments and
patience throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank Professor Darrell Jackson and
Professor Jerry Parkinson for taking the time to provide me with valuable feedback and guidance.
Finally, I would like to thank my family, friends, and Ms. Jasmine Fathalla for their continued
support and encouragement.
See e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250,
258 (2007).
1

2
See Justin Meyers, Watch the Incredible 70-Year Evolution of the Cell Phone, Bus. Insider
(May 6, 2011, 10:47 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/complete-visual-history-of-cell-phones2011-5?op=1.

See id. A 2013 study conducted by the Pew Research Center found that more than ninetyone percent of all Americans use cell phones. Lee Ranie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults,
Pew Research Center (June 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cellphone-ownership-hits-91-of-adults/. This case note uses the term “cell phone” to encompass both
smart phones with internet and advanced computing capabilities as well as traditional cell phones
with only the capability to make and receive phone calls and send/receive text messages. A smart
phone is a cellular phone with a broad range of functions based on advanced computing capability,
large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2479 (2014).
3

4
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014). Smart phones today not only
have the ability to record data on incoming and outgoing calls and text messages, but also
information about how often an individual accesses the internet, what websites were browsed,
and the individual’s location. Fact Sheet 2b: Privacy in the Age of the Smartphone, Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, (Feb. 2, 2015), available at https://www.privacyrights.org/smartphone-cell%20
phone-privacy#smartphonedata.
5

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2479.
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Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue and held
that warrantless cell phone searches are not permissible during a search incident to
lawful arrest (SILA).6 This case note examines Riley and argues that, although the
holding is supported by public policy, it improperly protects digital information
to a greater degree than it does tangible documents under the Fourth Amendment,
leading to unintended consequences.7
The first part of this case note discusses the history of the Fourth Amendment,
the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures, and the legal precedent
regarding searches incident to lawful arrest.8 The second part outlines the facts and
the majority and concurring opinions of Riley.9 The third part argues that while
the holding of Riley is consistent with public policy, unintended consequences
may result which will require the Court to reevaluate the treatment of tangible
items during a SILA in the future.10

Background
The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a vital
safeguard of the right to individual privacy. Specifically, it provides: “The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . [.]”11
More generally, the Fourth Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes
to obtain a warrant.12 The judicial process for obtaining a warrant requires a
magistrate or judge to authorize and issue a search or arrest warrant based upon
a sufficient showing of probable cause.13 Searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are held to be per se
unreasonable.14 However, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Johnson v. United
States, “[t]here are exceptional circumstances . . . [under which] a magistrate’s

6

Id. at 2493.

7

Id. at 2480.

8

See infra notes 11–82 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 83–154 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 155–200 and accompanying text.

11

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48, 51 (1951)).
12

Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b). The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant be supported with
probable cause and that it particularly describes the person or place to be searched or seized. U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
13

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (Stating that warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358, (1967)) (emphasis added).
14
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warrant for a search may be dispensed with.”15 One exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is a SILA.16

Search Incident to Lawful Arrest
A SILA is a valid search of an arrestee conducted without a warrant in order to
remove weapons and seize evidence on an arrestee’s person.17 In Agnello v. United
States, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search
the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by
which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to
effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.18
SILAs are justified as an exception to the warrant requirement for two reasons:
to protect and maintain officer safety during an arrest, and to preserve evidence
after making an arrest.19 During a SILA, police officers are authorized to search
the person, purses, wallets, and other objects found on the arrestee’s person.20 The
SILA exception is only available at the time of an arrest.21 Under this exception,
the government’s interest in preserving evidence and officer safety outweighs
individual privacy rights, thus justifying the search.22
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court established the
broad scope of a SILA exception in Harris v. United States and United States v.

15
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948) (holding that if the need for effective
law enforcement outweighs the right of privacy, the warrant requirement may be dispensed with).
Exceptions to the general rule requiring search warrants include: exigent circumstances, searches
incident to lawful arrests, searches of cars and containers therein, the plain view doctrine, inventory
searches, and consent. See 1 Joshua Dressler & Alan C. Michaels, Understanding Criminal
Procedure: Investigation 179–259 (6th ed. 2013).
16
William W. Greenhalgh, The Fourth Amendment Handbook, 16 (2010). Other
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include: The Carroll Doctrine, the suitcase or
container exception, exigent or emergency circumstances, stop and frisk, the plain view doctrine,
and consent by the party to be searched. See Joshua Dressler & Alan C. Michaels, supra note 15.
17

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).

Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 158 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
18

19

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 337 (2009).

20

See Joshua Dressler & Alan C. Michaels, supra note 15 at 191.

Thomas N. McInnis, The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment (2009) at 88 (quoting
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
21

22

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
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Rabinowitz.23 In Harris, the defendant was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant at
his apartment for mail fraud and intent to defraud a bank.24 After the arrest, agents
searched each room of the apartment and all furniture, ultimately discovering
in a closed bedroom drawer incriminating documents in an envelope marked
“George Harris, personal papers.”.25 The Court addressed whether the search was
a valid SILA and held that because the evidence was obtained without violating
the defendant’s constitutional rights, the search was valid.26 Moreover, the Court
recognized that “a search incident to arrest may . . . extend beyond the person
[of the arrest] to include the premises under his immediate control.”27 Because
the defendant in Harris was in exclusive possession of the entire apartment, his
control extended to all of the rooms, not just the room in which he was arrested.28
A few years after Harris, the Court decided the issue of whether a search of an
arrestee’s entire office fell under the scope of a valid SILA in Rabinowitz.29
In Rabinowitz, the defendant was arrested at his place of business for possessing
and concealing forged government postage stamps.30 After Rabinowitz’s arrest,
police officers searched the desk, safe, and file cabinets in his office and seized 573
stamps.31 The Court held the search valid as incident to a legal arrest.32 Writing for
the majority, Justice Minton reasoned that a SILA includes the premises under the
control of the person arrested and the area in which the crime was committed.33
Twenty years later, the foundational case of Chimel v. California—which
discussed the boundaries of the SILA exception—called into question the
holdings in Harris and Rabinowitz.34 After Defendant was convicted of burglary,
he appealed through the California state court system claiming the police obtained
evidence during an unconstitutional search of his home. Upon review, the Supreme
Court of California determined that a warrantless search of an arrestee’s home is

See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145 (1947).
23

24

Harris, 331 U.S. at 148.

Id. at 149. The agents discovered incriminating evidence which was presented at trial,
leading to the defendant’s conviction. Id.
25

26

Id. at 155.

27

Id. at 151.

28

Id. at 152.

29

See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 59 (1950).

30

Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 58.

31

Id. at 59.

32

Id. at 60.

33

Id. at 61.

34

See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 757–61 (1969).
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justified if the search was conducted incident to a valid arrest inside the home.35
Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and overruled
both Harris and Rabinowitz, holding that the search of a home is unjustified
under the SILA exception because, by going beyond the arrestee’s person and the
area within his immediate control, the search’s scope was exceeded.36 In Chimel,
the Court stated that a warrantless SILA is reasonable only when executed to
seize weapons that could be used to assault an officer or to preserve evidentiary
items from possible destruction.37 Furthermore, the Court held a valid SILA only
includes the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control.38 Although
Chimel provided guidance on the boundaries of a SILA, the Court did not address
whether arresting officers may search containers found in the area within an
arrestee’s immediate control. This issue stood open for debate until 1973, when
the Court decided United States v. Robinson.39

SILAs and Containers
In Robinson, the Court attempted to create a bright-line rule regarding
whether law enforcement officers may search containers during a SILA.40 In doing
so, the Court revisited the scope of a SILA and addressed the issue of whether a
police officer may search tangible items found on an arrestee’s person during an
arrest.41 The defendant in Robinson was stopped by a police officer and arrested for
operating a vehicle under a revoked driver’s license.42 In accordance with standard
police procedures, the officer searched the defendant and felt an object in the left
breast pocket of defendant’s coat, but could not readily identify the object.43 To
ensure the item was not a weapon, the officer reached into the defendant’s pocket
and pulled out the object: a “crumpled-up cigarette package.”44 As the officer

35
Id. at 753–55. In Chimel, three police officers arrested Defendant inside his own home for
the burglary of a coin shop. The officers asked for permission to look around Defendant’s home,
and Defendant denied their request. The officers subsequently searched the entire house, and
directed Defendant’s wife to open drawers in some rooms. The officers seized numerous items that
were admitted into evidence during trial for burglary charges. Chimel argued that the items were
unconstitutionally seized. His argument was rejected and he was ultimately convicted. Id.
36

Id. at 768.

37

Id. at 764.

Id. at 763 (emphasis added). The Court defined the area within one’s immediate control
as the area from within which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence. Id.
38

39

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).

40

John Wesley Hall, Jr., Search and Seizure 22–2 (5th ed. 2013).

41

Robinson, 414 U.S. at 218.

42

Id. at 220.

43

Id. at 223.

44

Id.
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felt the package, he believed the package did not contain cigarettes. Therefore,
the officer opened the package and found capsules of white powder, which later
proved to be heroin.45 The capsules were seized and admitted into evidence at the
defendant’s trial.46
The Court began its analysis by reiterating the rationales underlying a
SILA: protection of arresting officers and preservation of evidence.47 The Court
stated that the purpose of a SILA applies to all arrests, and explained that the
likelihood of an arrestee possessing a dangerous weapon does not depend on
the type of crime committed.48 Based on the SILA justifications, the Court held
that all custodial arrests provide the officer with the ability to search the arrestee
to evaluate the potential presence of weapons, and to ensure preservation of
evidence.49 Justice Rehnquist added that, although an object is removed from
the defendant’s person, the officer is entitled to inspect the object and seize fruits
probative of criminal conduct.50
In 2009, expanding on Robinson, the Court addressed the issue of whether
police officers are permitted to search a vehicle incident to an arrest in the seminal
case Arizona v. Gant.51 In Gant, the defendant was arrested for driving under a
suspended license.52 After his arrest, the defendant was placed in the back of a
patrol car and his vehicle was searched.53 The Court held the SILA exception
did not apply in this situation because the defendant did not have the ability to
retrieve weapons or destroy evidence at the time of the search.54 In arriving at this
decision, the Court extended the Chimel standard to the search of vehicles.55 The
Court stated that police officers are authorized to search a vehicle incident to an
arrest only when the arrestee is “unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”56 In addition, the Court held

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 234.

48

Id.

49

Id.

Id. at 236. (citing Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1947); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299, 307 (1967); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972)).
50

51

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009).

52

Id at 332.

53

Id.

54

Id at 333.

55

See id. at 343.

See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. Although a search is reasonable in these circumstances, Justice
Stevens stated that it is a rare situation because police officers are trained and equipped to ensure a
safe arrest of the occupants of a vehicle. Id. at 340 n.5.
56
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an officer is permitted to search an arrestee’s entire vehicle if the officer reasonably
believes he will discover evidence relevant to the crime of the arrest.57
Gant, Robinson, and Chimel all provide foundational information and
boundaries for delineating when application of the SILA exception to the warrant
requirement is justified.58 However, these cases do not address the SILA excepstion as applied to digital storage devices.59 Because Gant, Robinson, and Chimel
did not address digital devices, courts are being forced to reexamine the SILA
exception in its entirety as digital storage technology continues to advance.60

SILA and Cell Phones
When faced with the issue of whether warrantless cell phone searches and
other digital devices are permitted during a SILA, many courts have answered
affirmatively.61 For instance, in United States v. Finley, the Fifth Circuit addressed
whether the SILA exception applied to cell phone searches generally.62 Finley held
warrantless searches of call records and text messages contained on an arrestee’s
cell phone are permissible during a SILA. 63 Applying the holding from Robinson,
the court held the search of the cell phone was both reasonable and lawful.64
Moreover, Finley stated “[p]olice officers . . . may look for evidence of the
arrestee’s crime on his person in order to preserve it for use at trial.”65 The court

57

Id. at 335.

58

See supra notes 35–57 and accompanying text.

See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973); Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
59

60

See infra notes 61–76 and accompanying text.

See e.g. United States v. Murphy, 552 F. 3d. 405, 410–12 (4th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Mendoza, 421 F. 3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Curtis, 635 F. 3d 704 (4th Cir.
2009); United States v. Rodriguez, 702 F. 3d 206 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Pineda-Areola,
372 Fed. Appx. 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2010); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed. Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir.
2009); People v. Diaz, 244 P. 3d 501, 511 (2011); United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134,
149 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
61

62

See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 258 (2007).

Id. at 253–59. In Finley, Defendant was arrested for aiding and abetting possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Upon arrest and questioning, a Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) Special Agent searched through call records and text messages contained within
Defendant’s cell phone. The agent discovered text messages on the cell phone that appeared to
be related to narcotics use and trafficking. Defendant contended that the text messages and other
information obtained from the search of his cell phone should not have been allowed as evidence
during his trial. Id.
63

64

Id. at 259.

Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 223–24 (1973)). In Finley, the
defendant was arrested for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The defendant’s
cell phone was searched for evidence of narcotics use and trafficking. Id. at 255.
65
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also noted that the permissible scope of a SILA extends to any container found
on an arrestee’s person.66 Relying on Robinson and Chimel, Finley concluded the
warrantless search was lawful as a SILA, and therefore the officer was permitted to
search the defendant’s phone pursuant to his arrest.67
Similarly, in People v. Diaz, the court upheld a warrantless search of a cell
phone incident to an arrest.68 In Diaz, the defendant was arrested for co-conspiring
in the sale of ecstasy.69 A detective seized the defendant’s cell phone and a sheriff
conducted a warrantless search of text messages contained on the cell phone
at the sheriff ’s station and found evidence of an illegal drug transaction.70 The
defendant moved to suppress the incriminating evidence contained in the text
messages, but was unsuccessful.71 The California Supreme Court held that based
on the United States Supreme Court’s binding precedent, “the warrantless search
of defendant’s cell phone was valid.”72 Given the cell phone was within the area of
the defendant’s immediate control, the court applied the rationale from Robinson
and determined the arresting officer was entitled to inspect the phone’s contents
without a warrant.73 The defendant argued that based on the quantity of personal
information cell phones store, it should not be treated as a container.74 The court
rejected this argument stating that “the [Supreme Court] has expressly rejected
the view that the validity of a warrantless search depends on the character of
the searched item.”75 Before Riley, the Court did not address whether digital
information is equivalent to tangible information for the purposes of a SILA.
However, in other aspects of the law, the Court has treated digital information as
equivalent to its tangible counterpart.76

Digital Information
One example where Congress held digital information to be equivalent to
its pre-digital counterpart is provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE).77

66

Id. at 259 (citing United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988)).

67

Finley, 477 F.3d at 260.

68

People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011).

69

Id. at 503.

70

Id. at 502–03.

71

Id. at 503.

72

Id. at 511.

73

Id. at 506.

74

Id.

75

Id. at 507 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)).

76

See e.g. Fed. R. Evid. 1001.

Fed. R. Evid. 1001. The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted by order of the Supreme
Court in 1972. Federal Rules of Evidence, Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). The purpose of the FRE was to provide uniform rules to govern
77

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss2/10

8

Peters: Criminal Procedure - More Protection for Digital Information: The

2015

Case Note

579

Rule 1001, in the FRE, provides definitions for the contents of writings,
recordings and photographs.78 The Rule states: “[w]ritings and recordings consist
of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting,
typing, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or
electronic recording, or other form of data compilation.”79 Congress specifically
enacted Rule 1001 with the intent to treat tangible and digital information equal
for the purposes of evidentiary matters.80 The United States Supreme Court
adopted these rules with the understanding that, in evidentiary inquiries, digital
documents would be equivalent to their pre-digital counterparts.81 Interestingly,
in Riley v. California, the Court departed from its previous treatment of digital
information, as equivalent to tangible documents, and held that warrantless
searches of cell phones violate the Fourth Amendment.82

Principal Case
Factual Background
In Riley v. California, defendant David Riley was stopped by a police officer
while driving a motor vehicle with expired registration tags under a suspended
driver’s license.83 Riley’s car was subsequently impounded and a standard inventory
search of the vehicle was conducted.84 The search revealed two handguns under
the hood of Riley’s car.85 After this discovery, Riley was arrested for possession of
concealed and loaded firearms and the arresting officer searched Riley incident to
arrest.86 The officer confiscated and explored Riley’s cell phone, resulting in the
federal courts. Josh Camson, History of the Federal Rules of Evidence, American Bar Association,
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/061710-trial-evidence-federalrules-of-evidence-history.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
78

Fed. R. Evid. 1001.

79

Fed. R. Evid. 1001(a)–(e).

Fed. R. Evid. 1001 advisory committee’s note. “Present day techniques have expanded
methods of storing data, yet the essential form which the information ultimately assumes for usable
purposes is words and figures.” Id.
80

81

See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.

82

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).

83

Id. at 2480.

Id. After lawfully taking custody of vehicles or other property, police officers may conduct
a warrantless search of property in police custody. Courts have held inventory searches of vehicles
to be lawful including searches of passenger compartments, glove compartments, trunk, engine
compartments, and any containers in the vehicle. Article: I. Investigations and Police Practices, 37
Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 3.
84

85

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.

Id. The arresting officer found items associated with the “Bloods” street gang. The “Bloods”
are a national street gang, and one of the most violent criminal organizations in the United States.
Gang activities include murder, assault, robbery, and narcotics distribution. Commonwealth of Va.
Dep’t of State Police Va. Fusion Ct’r, Bloods Street Gang Intelligence Report, (Nov. 2008),
available at https://info.publicintelligence.net/BloodsStreetGangIntelligenceReport.pdf.
86
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discovery of information consistent with members of the Bloods street gang.87
Two hours after Riley’s arrest, a gang detective analyzed the information stored on
Riley’s phone and found incriminating photographs of Riley.88
These photographs led to additional charges and ultimately, Riley was
convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, firing at an occupied vehicle,
and attempted murder.89 The district court denied Riley’s motion to suppress and
convicted him on all charges.90 The appellate court affirmed the district court’s
holding, and the California Supreme Court denied Riley’s petition for review.91
However, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
trial court erred in denying Riley’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from
his cell phone.92

Majority Opinion
The Court addressed whether police officers can search digital information
stored on a cell phone seized from an individual during a SILA without a warrant.93
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts stated that warrantless searches of
digital information on cell phones conducted during a SILA violate the Fourth
Amendment.94 The Court’s analysis began by examining whether such a search
was reasonable.95 In doing so, the Court looked to Chimel for guidance.96
As stated in Chimel, the first rationale for a SILA is to ensure officer safety.97
In Riley, the Court addressed whether digital data stored on a cell phone could
be used as a weapon to endanger the arresting officer.98 The Court held that
a cell phone could no longer be used as a weapon after the initial search for

87

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.

Id. The detective searched Riley’s phone to find other evidence, such as pictures or videos,
which might link Riley to the Bloods street gang. The detective found photographs of Riley standing
in front of a car thought to be involved in a gang shooting a few weeks earlier. Id. at 2481.
88

89

Id. at 2481.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id. at 2480.

94

Id. at 2485.

95

Id. at 2482.

Id. at 2485 (holding that purpose of a SILA is to prevent the arrestee from obtaining a
weapon to use against the officer or obtaining destructible evidence).
96

97

Id. at 2484.

98

Id.
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physical weapons contained around or inside the cell phone occurred.99 Because
no potential physical threats were present in Riley, the Court found the additional
search of the data stored on the cell phone failed to satisfy the officer safety
justification of Chimel.100
Next, the Court examined the second rationale for a SILA as stated in
Chimel.101 This analysis required the Court to determine if a search of the digital
information on Riley’s cell phone prevented the destruction of evidence.102 Riley
argued that once a cell phone is confiscated, an arrestee is no longer able to
delete, alter, or destroy any incriminating evidence stored on the cell phone.103
Therefore, according to Riley, the preservation of evidence justification for the
SILA exception did not apply.104 In comparison, the prosecution argued that
both remote wiping and data encryption are methods used to destroy evidence
after a cell phone is confiscated.105 Based on that contention, the prosecution
maintained the warrantless search of the defendant’s cell phone was justified to
preserve evidence.106
In response to both arguments, the Court suggested alternative methods
police officers could have implemented in order to prevent remote wiping and data
encryption from occurring.107 First, Chief Justice Roberts explained that because

Id. While the data stored in the phone did not qualify as a weapon, the majority explained
that police officers are free to search the area between the cell phone and a cell phone case. A search
of these areas may be conducted to ensure that a physical weapon—such as a razor blade—that may
pose harm to the arresting officer is not hidden in a phone. Id.
99

100
Id. The prosecution further argued that searching cell phone data may alert the arresting
officer if the arrestee had notified other assailants who may come to the scene and potentially cause
danger to the officer. The Court held the aforementioned interest in protecting an arresting officer
did not justify a bright-line rule disposing of the warrant requirement to search the contents of a cell
phone during a SILA. Id. at 2485–86.
101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 2486.

Id. Remote wiping occurs when a phone connected to a wireless network receives a signal
which causes all data stored on the phone to be erased. Remote wiping can be triggered by the two
following circumstances: activation by a third party, or automatic preprogramming of the phone to
delete data under specific circumstances, such as leaving a certain geographic area. Data encryption
is an additional security feature that some cell phones use to protect stored data in addition to
a passcode protection. When a cell phone locks, the data become protected by a sophisticated
encryption algorithm that is inaccessible unless the password is entered. Id.
105

All major cell phone manufacturers provide remote wiping capabilities and such capability
may also be purchased from a mobile security company. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d
803, 807 (7th Cir. 2012).
106

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486.

107

Id.
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remote wiping occurs when a cell phone is connected to a wireless network, police
officers could have simply removed the battery from the cell phone.108 Second,
the majority suggested that the officers could have used a faraday bag to prevent
data encryption.109 As a result, the Court concluded that the possibility of remote
wiping and data encryption did not justify a warrantless search of the arrestee’s
cell phone during the SILA.110 Chief Justice Roberts also reasoned that it was not
clear whether a warrantless search would prevent occurrence remote wiping.111
Based on this reasoning, the Court held that the evidence preservation rationale
under Chimel did not justify the warrantless search of Riley’s cell phone.112
Even though the Court held the SILA exception in Riley was unsupported
under Chimel, the prosecution argued in the alternative, stating that the search
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the defendant’s privacy
interests were minimal.113 The government asserted that the search of Riley’s cell
phone was equivalent to the search of physical items on Riley’s person.114 The
Court rejected this argument because the Court found the quantity and quality
of personal information cell phones store implicate a higher degree of intrusion
when a search is conducted.115 The majority differentiated cell phones and nonelectronic objects based on certain identifiable characteristics, including the type
of information contained and the amount of information discoverable.116 Because
cell phones store a significant amount of personal information, the Court detailed
four privacy implications created by warrantless cell phone searches.117
First, cell phones store a wide array of information, such as videos, contact
information, and personal notes. Thus, if police officers were permitted to search
cell phones, they would have unfettered access to a variety of information that
Id. A cell phone that is powered off is unable to connect to a wireless network, thus
preventing remote wiping from occurring. Id.
108

109
Id. A faraday bag is an enclosure that isolates a cell phone from radio waves while it is still
powered on. Faraday bags are essentially bags made of aluminum foil that prevent the phone from
receiving radio waves. Id.
110

Id. at 2487.

Id. at 2486. The majority continued by arguing in the alternative, stating that even if law
enforcement officers had the ability to search the contents of a cell phone without first obtaining
a valid warrant, it would be very unlikely that the cell phone would be in an unlocked state upon
confiscation, and thus the information would be inaccessible regardless. Id. at 2487.
111

Id. at 2486. The Court noted that during an arrest, police officers have more pressing issues
to attend to in order to ensure an effective and safe arrest than the search of data contained on a cell
phone. Often the cell phone data may not even be able to be searched until hours after the arrest,
which would not prevent remote wiping from occurring. Id. at 2487.
112

113

See id. at 2488.

114

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488.

115

Id.

116

See id. at 2489 (distinguishing a cell phone from a cigarette package and other tangible objects).

117

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
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otherwise would be unavailable.118 Second, the immense storage capacity of a
cell phone gives users the ability to store large quantities of private information
unavailable in other forms.119 Third, cell phones have the ability to store
information for long periods of time.120 Given the large storage capacity, individ
uals are able to store past and present information on a hand-held device. Finally,
cell phones do not present a historical issue because they did not exist at the
time of reference, when “physical records” documented personal information.121
In contrast, modern cell phones are exceedingly prevalent in society and capable
of storing large amounts of personal information.122 In fact, more than seventyfive percent of all cell phone users indicated they kept their cell phones within
five feet of themselves at almost all times.123Based on the aforementioned privacy
implications, the Court determined that warrantless searches of cell phones
intrude on an individual’s privacy rights.124
Riley also found that the quality, in addition to the quantity, of information stored on cell phones was a significant factor in the analysis.125 The Court
explained that smart phones have the ability to browse the internet, store
information on applications, and remember terms imputed into search engines.126
Thus, a cell phone search might reveal very personal information and significantly
invade an individual’s privacy.127 The Court also dismissed the age-old maxim
118

Id.

Id. New smart phones often come with 16GB to 64GB of storage capacity. Understanding
Smartphone Storage, About Technology, http://cellphones.about.com/od/coveringthebasics/fl/
Understanding-Smartphone-Storage.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
119

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. Other physical objects a person might carry around with him or
herself would not record all of that individual’s acts for a long period of time, and therefore are not
comparable. Id.
120

121

Id. at 2490.

122

See id.

123

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (citation omitted).

124

Id. at 2493.

125

Id. at 2490.

Id. With the development of mobile application software, there is an application available
for almost every aspect of an individual’s life, and such software can contain almost limitless
information. As of June 2014, the iPhone App Store contains approximately 1,200,000 applications
available to mobile devices. Sam Costello, How Many Apps Are in the iPhone App Store? About
Technology, http://ipod.about.com/od/iphonesoftwareterms/qt/apps-in-app-store.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2015).
126

Depending on the operating system and capabilities of a particular smartphone, the number
of applications it can hold ranges from 2,160 to 41,040. Sam Costello, How Many iPhone Apps and
iPhone Folders Can I Have? About Technology, http://ipod.about.com/od/usingios4/f/IphoneApps-Iphone-Folders.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
127
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. An individual’s search history can contain personal information
ranging from his or her health, mental state, interests, travel locations, fears, and shopping habits.
Molly Wood, Sweeping Away a Search History, New York Times (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/04/03/technology/personaltech/sweeping-away-a-search-history.html?_r=0.
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that searching the contents of a man’s pocket is far different from the contents of
his house.128 Today, a search of an individual’s pocket would likely reveal a smart
phone, a device containing more information than an exhaustive search of an
individual’s home would reveal.129
In contrast, the prosecution in Riley offered three arguments for allowing
warrantless searches of cell phones upon arrest. First, the government argued the
Gant standard for vehicle searches should be extended to the warrantless search of
cell phones.130 The Court rejected this argument because it requires the arresting
officer to determine whether the phone contains evidence of a crime on a case-bycase basis, instead of creating a bright-line rule.131 Moreover, extending the Gant
standard to cell phone searches provides police officers with unfettered authority
to search the contents of a cell phone.132
Second, the government proposed to limit searches to the areas of a cell
phone that an officer reasonably believes contain information regarding the crime
committed.133 The Court rejected this proposal reasoning that these searches
would likely discover information beyond the scope of the initial search.134
Finally, the government offered a third argument that would allow a police
officer to search cell phone data if information sought could have been obtained
before cell phones were invented.135 In rejecting this proposition, the Court stated
that a search for one specific piece of information does not justify the ability
to rummage through all the other data contained on the phone.136 Further, the
Court reasoned that it was implausible that Riley would have walked around with
incriminating videotapes and photographs in his pockets before the invention
of modern cell phones.137 Additionally, the government’s proposal was rejected
because of the difficulty of comparing a modern phenomenon, such as an e-mail,

128

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.

129

Id.

Id. at 2492. Extending the Gant standard would allow a warrantless search of an arrestee’s
cell phone whenever it is reasonable to believe it contains evidence of the crime. Id.
130

Id. This proposal was also rejected because the Gant standard is based on the notion that
individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy rights when motor vehicles are involved (quoting
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631 (2001)).
131

132

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.

Id. at 2492. For example, if an arresting officer reasonably believed evidence of narcotics
trafficking would be found in text messages to another individual, the officer would have the ability
to search messages sent between the arrestee and the other individual.
133

134

Id. .

135

Id. at 2493.

136

Id.

137

Id.
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to the pre-digital equivalent of that type of information, such as a letter, package,
or video-tape.138
After assessing all of the arguments, the Court held that an individual’s right
to privacy outweighs the government’s interest in a warrantless search of a cell
phone upon arrest.139 In analyzing cell phone searches in relation to the Fourth
Amendment, Chief Justice Roberts said, “the fact that technology now allows an
individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information
any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”140

Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Although Justice Alito agreed with the Court’s holding in Riley, he argued
the SILA exception serves a purpose more broad than ensuring officer safety and
preserving evidence.141 Justice Alito contended that the basis for adoption of
the SILA exception was to obtain probative evidence.142 He reasoned that after
confiscation, there is no chance an item will be destroyed or used to harm the
officer.143 He also argued the officer safety and evidence preservation rationales
centered on the “search of the scene of the arrest and not the search of the
arrestee.”144 Justice Alito reasoned that the justifications provided in Chimel
should not affect the search of the arrestee’s person incident to arrest.145
Furthermore, Justice Alito explained that the bright-line rule established
by the majority should not be applied mechanically.146 Instead, he suggested
a balancing test be implemented, weighing the interests of law enforcement
officers and individual’s privacy.147 Justice Alito viewed the Court’s opinion to be
unjust because it provides more protection for digital information than physical
information.148 Because digital information stored on a cell phone is not subject
to a SILA, it is afforded greater protection than tangible items subject to the

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

Id. at 2495.

141

Id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring).

Id. Probative evidence is evidence that tends to prove or disprove a point in issue. Black’s
Law Dictionary 283 (4th pocket ed.1996). The Court has stated that the origin of the rule derives
from the State’s interest in seizing property from an arrestee’s possession that will be used as evidence
during trial, in order to obtain a conviction. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (citations omitted).
142

143

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring).

144

Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).

145

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring).

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Id.
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SILA exception.149 Justice Alito explained if two separate individuals are arrested
who possess the same information, but one has the information recorded on a
piece of paper and the other has it stored on her cell phone, under the majority’s
holding, the same rule does not apply to both individuals.150 Rather, the officer is
authorized to examine the information on the paper without first obtaining the
warrant, but a warrant is required to search the information contained on the
other individual’s cell phone.151
Finally, Justice Alito urged Congress to assess the needs of law enforcement
and weigh them against the privacy interests of individuals.152 Based on the Court’s
analysis of cell phones and the Fourth Amendment, Justice Alito suggested the
issue regarding law enforcement’s ability to search digital information contained
on an arrestee’s cell phone should be left for Congress to decide.153 Justice Alito
stated modern cell phones have a wide array of capabilities including both lawful
and unlawful functions and the Court is not in the best position to evaluate and
weigh the government’s interest against an individual’s privacy interest.154

Analysis
Although the holding is supported by public policy, Riley improperly
provides heightened protection for digital information than tangible documents
under the Fourth Amendment, leading to unintended consequences. First, the
Court properly determined that warrantless searches of cell phones significantly
intrude on an individual’s right to privacy for public policy reasons.155 Second,
the holding improperly distinguished digital information from its tangible, predigital counterpart.156 Finally, the Court will need to reevaluate SILAs of tangible
documents in the future to afford the same protection for information stored on
different mediums to avoid unintended consequences.157

Correct Outcome Based on Public Policy
When drafting the Constitution, the Framers did not consider how the Fourth
Amendment would apply to modern technological advances because such topics
149

See id.

150

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring).

151

Id. at 2497.

152

Id.

Id. Justice Alito cited electronic surveillance as an example where the Court spoke on this
issue first, based solely on Constitutional rights, and Congress enacted subsequent legislation and
thus the issue of electronic surveillance was governed by the State and not the courts. Id.
153

154

Id.

155

See infra notes 158–68 and accompanying text.

156

See infra notes 169–93 and accompanying text.

157

See infra notes 194–200 and accompanying text.
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were unforeseeable.158 In contrast, when Riley was decided, a majority of American
citizens used cell phones daily as a means of communication, data storage, and
entertainment.159 The prevalence of cell phones in society is significant because
Riley advocates to protect individual privacy rights during an arrest.160
The Fourth Amendment serves as a mechanism for balancing individual
privacy interests against governmental interests.161 As Justice Harlan stated, “[an]
individual’s sense of security must be balanced against the utility of the conduct as
a technique of law enforcement.”162 In applying the Fourth Amendment balancing
test, a warrantless search of a cell phone would be a significant intrusion on an
individual’s right to privacy.163 Individual privacy rights outweigh the government’s
interest in a search of a cell phone incident to arrest because warrants are generally
available in a short period of time.164 Another factor supporting this conclusion is
that law enforcement officers have other options available to preserve evidence.165
A bright-line rule prohibiting warrantless searches of cell phones incident to
arrests prevents police officers from having the ability to access an arrestee’s
personal information without a warrant.166 Although preventing an officer from
searching an arrestee’s cell phone without a warrant may have an adverse effect
on law enforcement’s ability to combat crime, Riley correctly determined that
individual privacy interests outweigh the government’s interests.167 Additionally,
if a judge or magistrate determines a search of a cell phone is reasonable and
subsequently issues a warrant, the scope of the search will be narrowly defined to
protect the individual from an unreasonable search.168

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26–27, Riley v. State, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-132),
2013 WL 3934033. Even as little as thirty-five years ago, the Court could not have envisioned that
the majority of arrestees would be carrying an item containing intangible evidence. Id.
158

See Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults, Pew Research Center
(June 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownershiphits-91-of-adults/.
159

160

See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2484, 2493–95 (2014).

161

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).

162

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

163

See infra notes 164–68 and accompanying text.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 27, Riley v. State, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-132).
If it is necessary to search the contents of a cell phone, a warrant may be requested of a judge, signed,
and e-mailed back to the officer in a short period of time. At least 30 states provide for electronic
warrant applications. Missouri v. McNeely, 184 L. Ed. 2d, 696, 721 (2013). Utah is one state that
uses an e-warrant procedure in which judges have been known to issue warrants in as little as five
minutes. Jason Bergreen, Faster Warrant System Hailed, Salt Lake Tribune, Dec. 26, 2008 at B1.
164

165

See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.

166

See supra note 139 and accompanying text.

167

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493–94 (2014).

See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (stating that the Fourth Amendment
requires particularity in the warrant or the things to be seized).
168
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Digital Data Distinguished
Although Riley is supported by public policy, the holding improperly
provides heightened protection for digital information.169 Based on the Court’s
treatment of digital information in other fields as well as previous SILA precedent,
Riley improperly distinguishes digital data from its pre-digital counterpart.170
The holding also provides greater protection for digital information than
for information contained on paper for the purposes of a SILA.171 As a result,
Riley erroneously provides greater protection for information contained on an
individual’s cell phone than for the same information was contained on a piece of
paper in an arrestee’s pocket.172
Under a Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court should have held the term
“papers” to be synonymous with its digital equivalent.173 As Justice Alito correctly
stated in his concurrence, the “Court’s broad holding favors information in
digital form over information in hard-copy form.”174 If the same information is
contained on a cell phone or a document, the Fourth Amendment should provide
the same amount of protection to all “papers.”175 Instead, Riley provides police
officers with a different rule to follow when searching digital information found
on an arrestee.176 Riley also provides that the form in which a individual’s personal
information is recorded determines the level of protection it receives, reflecting a
preference for the greater protection of digital information.177
Previously, the validity of a search did not depend on the character of the
item being searched.178 However, because a custodial arrest gives police officers
authority to conduct a SILA, the officer is entitled to inspect tangible objects

169

See supra notes 158–68 and accompanying text.

170

See infra notes 171–93 and accompanying text.

171

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).

172

See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.

See Brianne Gorod, The “papers and effects” on your cell phone may not be as private as you
think, nat’l Constitution ctr (August 30, 2013), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2013/08/
the-papers-and-effects-on-your-cell-phone-may-not-be-as-private-as-you-think/; See supra note 11
and accompanying text.
173

174

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).

See id.; Josh Daniels, Protecting the 4th Amendment in the Digital Age, Libertas
Institute (March 25, 2014), http://libertasutah.org/center-for-individual-liberty/protecting-the4th-amendment-in-the-digital-age/.
175

Orin Kerr, The Significance of Riley. Wash. Post. (June 25, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/25/the-significance-of-riley/.
176

177

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).

People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
825 (1982)).
178
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found on an arrestee’s person.179 The Court has consistently held in Gant,
Robinson, and Chimel that the contents found on an arrestee may be examined
without a warrant during a SILA and has “long accepted that written items found
on the person of an arrestee may be examined and used at trial.”180 This same legal
analysis should have been extended in Riley to digital data, which would allow the
officer to examine the contents of an arrestee’s cell phone.

Cell Phone as a Container
In Riley, the majority distinguished a cell phone from other containers based
on the quantity and quality of information stored.181 Yet, in Chimel, the Court
overruled both Harris and Rabinowitz by stating that searches of entire homes
were beyond the area within a defendant’s immediate control, but did not base
its opinion on the quantity or quality of the information stored.182 In Rabinowitz,
the officers searched the defendant’s desk, safe, and file cabinets.183 Those objects
had the ability to store a significant quantity of personal information from
the individual’s entire life. However, in Chimel, the sole basis for overruling
Harris and Rabinowitz was the scope of the SILA, not the quality and quantity
of information at stake.184 Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that if the information were stored in an area within the defendant’s immediate control, the SILA
would have been valid even though the object of the search had an immense
storage capacity.185
In comparison to Rabinowitz, in Riley, the defendant’s cell phone was seized
from his pocket incident to arrest.186 Based on the Chimel standard, the object
of the search needed to be on the arrestee’s person or in the area within his
immediate control.187 Because the cell phone was found on the defendant’s person
in Riley, the search did not exceed the Chimel standard for the scope of a SILA.188
Although the Chimel standard was satisfied, the Court distinguished a cell phone
from other tangible objects based on the quality and quantity of information

179

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring); see generally, e.g., Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, (2009).
180

181

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–91.

182

Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.

183

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 59 (1950).

184

See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.

185

Id.

186

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).

187

Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.

188

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
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stored.189 In distinguishing the character of the item searched, the Court ignored
prior SILA precedent, which allowed the searches to be conducted regardless of
the storage capacities.190 Akin to a cell phone, an individual’s desk, safe, and file
cabinets have an immense storage capacity. The Court failed to recognize the
similarities between the cell phone in Riley and the storage containers in Harris
and Rabinowitz.191 In failing to do so, the Court misconstrued the purposes
of both Harris and Rabinowitz.192 Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court
improperly distinguished digital information from its tangible counterpart in the
context of a SILA.193

Future Implications
Cell phones have changed the way society stores information.194 For instance,
individuals increasingly store private information on their cell phones rather
than solely within the confines of their homes.195 However, providing greater
protection for digital information may also have an adverse effect on society. For
example, individuals may be encouraged to store information on their cell phones
instead of carrying tangible documents, eliminating the possibility of exposure
to a SILA. Since the information is not subject to a SILA, law enforcement’s
ability to effectively combat crime is thereby hindered.196 Even if Riley does not
directly encourage individuals to store data on their phones, it is very likely that
cell phones will become society’s main source of storing information.197 While the
holding exemplifies the Court’s emphasis on individual privacy interests, as cell
phones and their technological capabilities continue to advance, the Court will
need to reevaluate the government’s interest in searches of cell phone data.198
If the Court continues to place a high value on individual privacy interests
during a SILA, the Court may also need to reevaluate whether tangible documents

189

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–91.

190

See generally United States v. Rabinowitz 339 U.S. 56, 59 (1950).

See generally Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473; Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56; Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947).
191

192

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

193

See supra notes 181–92 and accompanying text.

See Justin Meyers, Watch the Incredible 70-Year Evolution of the Cell Phone, Bus. Insider
(May 6, 2011, 10:47 AM) http://www.businessinsider.com/complete-visual-history-of-cell-phones2011-5?op=1.
194

195
See Adam Lamparello and Charles E. Maclean, Riley v. California: Privacy Still Matters,
but How Much and in What Contexts?, 27 Regent University L. Rev. 25 (2014–2015).
196

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).

197

See id.

See id. at 2493. (stating the holding will affect law enforcement’s ability to combat crime
and that privacy comes at a cost).
198
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found on an arrestee’s person can be searched without a warrant. In Riley, the
Court stressed the importance of the Chimel rationales for a SILA, including
officer safety and the preservation of evidence.199 However, if an officer seizes
tangible documents from an individual during a SILA, the individual no longer
has the ability to destroy the evidence or use the document to harm the officer.
For example, if an officer seized a diary during a search incident to arrest, the diary
can no longer be used as a weapon, nor does the arrestee have the ability to destroy
the information contained within the diary. If it wishes to give weight to the
rule, the Court should hold that warrantless searches of tangible documents are
unjustified.200 Moreover, the Court should hold that searches of any information,
tangible or digital, are prohibited during a SILA without a warrant, thereby
affording equal protection to the same information stored on different mediums.

Conclusion
In Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that the warrantless
search of an arrestee’s cell phone was not justified by the SILA exception.201 The
Court’s reasoning was based on balancing an individual’s right to privacy against
the government’s interest in searching digital data contained on an arrestee’s
cell phone.202 Riley is significant because the holding improperly distinguishes
digital information from its pre-digital counterparts.203 As Justice Alito stated,
“the Court’s broad holding favors information in digital form over information
in hard-copy form.”204 The majority should have provided the same Fourth
Amendment protections to both digital and non-digital content, regardless of the
form of information at issue.205 Additionally, while the holding of Riley reflects
public policy, it will lead to unintended consequences and may require the Court
to reevaluate the degree of protection afforded to papers found on an arrestee’s
person.206 Finally, Chief Justice Roberts stated “[t]he fact that technology now
allows an individual to carry such information in his hand, does not make the
information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”207
However, the correct statement according to Riley is: The fact that technology
now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand, makes the
information more worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.

199

See id. at 2485–89.

200

See id. at 2483 (citation omitted).

201

See supra note 94 and accompanying text.

202

See supra notes 95–140 and accompanying text.

203

See supra notes 169–93 and accompanying text.

204

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).

205

See supra notes 169–93 and accompanying text.

206

See supra notes 194–200 and accompanying text.

207

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (emphasis added).
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